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Raining on the Litigation Parade: Is It
Time to Stop Litigant Abuse of the
Fraud on the Court Doctrine?
By HOLLEE S. TEMPLE*
IN 1995, AFTER YEARS of legal wrangling over the proper division of
a $140 million trust, litigation in the Pennsylvania court system
seemed to draw to a close. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania had
interpreted an ambiguous phrase in the trust document and approved
the trial court's division plan, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
had refused to consider further arguments.'
Fast forward to 2005. Though a decade had passed since final
judgment in the case, a group of trust beneficiaries who disagreed
with the Superior Court's decision convinced the Pennsylvania courts
to reconsider the very same trust division issue. 2 To overcome the ob-
vious bar of res judicata, the litigants alleged that beneficiaries who
received a larger share of the trust assets under the trial court's plan
had fraudulently procured the earlier decisions. 3
According to the litigants, the beneficiaries had duped the courts
into interpreting the pivotal phrase in the trust, a phrase the litigants
felt was clear on its face.4 Never mind that the appellate court had
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1. As an associate at a large law firm from 1999-2003, I joined a team of lawyers
representing some of the beneficiaries who were defending the 1995 judgment. All infor-
mation contained in this Article was gleaned from publicly available documents, including
published opinions and press reports.
2. See In re Deed of Trust of McCargo, Nos. 374 WDA 2003 & 375 WDA 2003 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2003); Brief for Appellants, In re Deed of Trust of McCargo, 844 A.2d
1293 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (No. 377 WDA 2003).
3. McCargo, Nos. 374 WDA 2003 & 375 WDA 2003.
4. Id. The litigants also alleged conflicts of interest and nondisclosure of documents,
but those allegations were deemed to be meritless by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Id. at 18-19.
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previously found the phrase in question to be "utterly ambiguous. '5
Never mind that both the trial and appellate courts explicitly stated
that their decisions were based upon a plain language reading of the
decedent's estate planning documents. 6 And never mind that both
courts had already ruled on the argument that the litigants were
bringing in the new proceedings. 7 Nevertheless, the litigants found a
sympathetic ear in a new trial court judge, and the case came full cir-
cle, with the originally successful litigants defending a judgment that
had been disposed of by all levels of Pennsylvania's court system years
before.
Cases attacking final judgments involve "the clash of two impor-
tant principles [-] that litigation must come to an end, and that jus-
tice should be accorded in a particular case."8 While the fraud on the
court doctrine was intended to safeguard the judicial system, 9 misuse
by litigants is weakening the integrity of final court decisions. Because
cases involving fraud on the court are not subject to standard time
limitations, the doctrine is particularly attractive to disappointed liti-
gants looking for the proverbial second (or third, or fourth) bite at
the apple.10 Further, in the win-at-any-cost era of litigation, the doc-
trine is complicated by procedural uncertainty, caused by plaintiffs
shopping for sympathetic courts in new arenas to reconsider their
claims.
Courts rarely reopen judgments. Nevertheless, because many of
the challenged judgments are decades old, the cases demand substan-
tial investments of time and money from both courts and defendants.
While courts rightly want to afford litigants the opportunity to investi-
gate claims of fraud, the very filing of a fraud-based claim begets an
intensive research effort, as litigants must backtrack through ware-
houses of court files to re-create the scene of the alleged fraudulent
5. See In re Deed of Trust of Grant McCargo, 652 A.2d 1330, 1334 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994).
6. See id. at 1335; see also In re Deed of Trust of McCargo, No. 2714 of 1948 (Pa. C.P.
Alleg. Cty. 1998).
7. McCargo, Nos. 374 WDA 2003 & 375 WDA 2003, at 6-7.
8. Brown v. Brown, 432 So. 2d 704, 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted),
overruled on other grounds by DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984).
9. See Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in Litigation
with a Spotlight on Insurance Coverage: The Doctrines ofJudicial Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel, Quasi-
Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, "Mend the Hold," "Fraud on the Court" and Judicial and Evidentiary
Admissions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 589, 707 (1998).
10. For recent examples of cases in which the "fraud on the court" doctrine is impli-
cated, see Dixon v. Comm'r, No. 00-70858, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4831 (9th Cir. Jan. 17,
2003); McCargo, Nos. 374 WDA 2003 & 375 WDA 2003; Brief for Appellants, In re Deed of
Trust of McCargo, 844 A.2d 1293 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (No. 377 WDA 2003).
[Vol. 39
activity.1 ' In addition, because both federal and state courts typically
require proof of fraud by "clear and convincing evidence,"'12 each alle-
gation requires an individualized case-by-case analysis, often dragging
on for years before the litigation parade finally draws to a close. Fur-
thermore, parties defending their judgments must invest substantial
time early in the litigation process researching the history of the
fraud-based claim. As a result, the typical safeguards against frivolous
litigation-Rule 12(b) (6)13 and Rule 1114 motions for sanctions-do
not ameliorate the damage to defendants whose judgments are under
attack on the basis of fraud on the court.15
This Article examines the current status of the fraud on the court
doctrine' 6 in both the federal and state courts. Specifically, the Article
argues that modem-day litigants have, at times, misused the doctrine,
which is intended to be applied only in a very narrow set of circum-
stances, to inject life into time-barred claims. 17 In fact, a number of
claims have passed through several stages of litigation before finally
being unmasked and thrown out by the courts. This practice poses a
great threat to the principle of finality in judgments and exposes both
opposing parties and the courts to unacceptable expenses.
Part I explores the provisions of Rule 6018 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which lay out the circumstances in which ajudgment
may be reopened. Rule 60, which encompasses the fraud on the court
doctrine, has served as a model for many states in drafting their own
rules of civil procedure regarding reopening judgments. Part I estab-
11. See e.g., Harless v. Pen Coal Corp., No. 3:01-0470 (S.D. W. Va. 2001); McCargo, Nos.
374 WDA 2003 & 375 WDA 2003; Brief for Appellants, In re Deed of Trust of McCargo, 844
A.2d 1293 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (No. 377 WDA 2003).
12. See 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.21[4] [h] (3d ed.
2004).
13. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
14. FED. R_ Cxv. P. 11.
15. Rule 12(b) (6) motions provide a defense for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b) (6). Rule 11 motions for sanctions expose attor-
neys to both monetary and nonmonetary punishment for filing frivolous actions. FED. R.
Crv. P. 11.
16. Both practitioners and courts seem to use the phrases "fraud on the court" and
"fraud upon the court" interchangeably.
17. The most extensive treatment of the fraud on the court doctrine appears in
Moore's Federal Practice treatise. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.21[4]. Fo 1 some addi-
tional recent writings on the topic, see generally Anderson & Holober, supra note 9; John
T. Kolinski, Fraud on the Court as a Basis for Dismissal with Prejudice or Default: An Old Remedy
Has New Teeth, FLA. B.J., Feb. 2004, at 16, 17.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 60.
Summer 2005] LITIGATION PARADE
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
lishes that only a few highly particularized forms of fraud properly fall
under the fraud on the court doctrine.
Part II reveals that the doctrine has been repeatedly misused in
numerous federal and state cases arising under Rule 60 or related
state statutes. Additionally, Part II describes problems associated with
misuse of the fraud on the court doctrine. Specifically, the practice
disturbs the finality of judgments and subjects opposing litigants to
potentially massive expense, even if the claim is eventually disposed
of. Finally, Part III considers whether screening mechanisms, im-
proved education of trial court judges, or modification of the doctrine
would help courts to more efficiently resolve fraud on the court
claims.
I. The Fraud on the Court Doctrine Provides a Narrow
Allowance for Reopening Judgments
To protect finality of judgments, both courts and legislatures de-
velop practices and rules to preclude litigants from repeating efforts
to obtain relief; in civil cases, the doctrines of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel "mark that concept."19 Yet the legal system must balance
its interest in finality with its concern for fairness, as there are specific
instances in which reconsideration of judgments and orders may be
warranted. 20 When litigants allege that a judgment has been obtained
by fraud on the court, the court must carefully balance these poten-
tially competing interests.
A. The Development of Fraud on the Court Under the Federal
Rules
Before adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 liti-
gants could choose from a variety of procedures to seek relief from
final judgments. The Supreme Court's Advisory Committee ("Com-
mittee") considered the problems associated with those various proce-
dures as it formulated Rule 60.22 In particular, the Committee noted
that because district courts were generally without power to recon-
sider judgments after their terms had expired, many had circum-
vented those time limits by establishing local rules that extended the
19. SeeJUDITH RESNIK, PROCESSES OF THE LAw: UNDERSTANDING COURTS AND THEIR AL-
TERNATIVES 79 (2004).
20. FED R. Civ. P. 60(b).
21. FED R. Cv. P.
22. See 12 MOORE, supra note 12, § 60 app. 101.
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time period for applications for relief 23 The Committee wanted the
new rule to both remedy this problem and simplify the procedures
available for seeking relief.
Drawing on section 473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
as its source for the new Rule 60,24 the Committee crafted a rule pro-
viding time limits for relief from judgments on the specified grounds
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.25 The origi-
nal text left unclear whether Rule 60 preserved certain ancillary com-
mon law and equitable remedies. 26 As a result, the Rule was amended
in 1946 to incorporate the substance of those remedies into stated
grounds for relief, and then to abolish them. 27
The 1946 amendments added "intrinsic or extrinsic" fraud and
"misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party" as speci-
fied grounds for relief28 and also added the deadline-free provision
for setting aside judgments for "fraud on the court. ' 29 While the in-
tent behind the amendment was to clarify the procedure for fraud-
based claims, Professor Moore noted the potential for confusion even
before the Rule was adopted. 30 In a 1946 Yale LawJournal article criti-
quing the proposed rules, Moore noted the difficulty associated with
distinguishing the types of fraud that fell within the one-year time
limit from claims for fraud upon the court.3' Moore stated:
Since courts exist to do justice, any fraud in the presentation of a
case to the court could plausibly be said to be fraud upon the
court, whether it be accomplished through the bribery of a mem-
ber of the court or jury, by the use of false or perjured testimony,
by concealing or suppressing testimony, by reference in a brief to
supposedly impartial authorities when these are known to be other-
wise, or by resorting to any sharp practice that hinders the fair
presentation of a claim or defense. 32
23. See 12 id.
24. See 12 id. § 60 app. 102 (citing CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 473 (Deering, 1937)).
25. See 12 id.
26. Those remedies included audita querela, coram nobis (or vobis), bill of review and
bill in the nature of a bill or review. See 12 id. § 60 app. 104. They are discussed thoroughly
at 12 MOORE, supra note 12, §§ 60 app. 104-08.
27. See 12 id. § 60 app. 104.
28. 12 id. § 60 app. 11[2] (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b) (1946)).
29. See 12 id. § 60 app. 11[2], 109.
30. See 12 id. § 60 app. 11; James Win. Moore & Elizabeth B.A. Rogers, Federal Relief
from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623 (1946).
31. Moore & Rogers, supra note 30, at 691-92.
32. Id. at 692 n.266. In his critique, Moore foreshadowed the problems that would
later arise as litigants attempted to characterize their fraud-based claims. Id. He noted that
while the Committee cited the landmark United States Supreme Court case of Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co. (discussed in detail infra Part I.C.) as an example of "fraud
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In sum, while the 1946 amendments transformed the pre-Rules
practice from a hodgepodge of options into a unified process, the
amendments also added a potentially confusing distinction between
different types of fraud.33 Other than the addition of a statutory refer-
ence in a 1948 amendment and a 1987 amendment to eliminate gen-
der specific language, the Rule remains in its 1946 form. 34
B. Relief from Judgment Under Federal Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure
1. Means for Relief from Judgment Under Federal Rule 60(b)
The intent of the new Rule 60(b), entitled "Relief from Judgment
or Order," was to substitute "either a simple motions procedure or an
independent action" for the various procedures that litigants had used
to obtain relief from judgments.3 5 The new rule retained independent
actions to set aside judgments under extraordinary circumstances and
created an exception for fraud upon the court.3 6 Neither an indepen-
dent action, nor an action based upon fraud on the court, is subject to
upon the court," Moore found it difficult to distinguish that case, in which an article by a
bogus expert influenced the appellate court's decision, from "any other type of fraud that
interferes with the administration of justice." Id.
33. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60 app. 100[1].
34. See 12 id. § 60 app. 109[5]-[6].
35. 12 id. § 60.21 [1) (citing FED. R Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note of 1946).
36. FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b). Specifically, the rule provides:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neg-
lect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other mis-
conduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judg-
ment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivi-
sion (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a
defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. § 1655,
or to set aside ajudgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram
vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review,
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from ajudgment shall
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
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the one-year statute of limitations applied to some of the other Rule
60(b) motions. 37 In sum, a motion under Rule 60(b), a motion to set
aside a judgment for fraud on the court, and an independent action
in equity provide the only "recognized means" outside of a timely ap-
peal for relief from a final judgment or order.38
Rule 60(b) provides several grounds for relieving parties of final
judgments, orders, or proceedings after the standard time limits for
seeking a post-trial motion or appeal have elapsed.39 Rule 60, which
contains six numbered clauses for setting aside otherwise final judg-
ments, strives to achieve the delicate balance between finality andjus-
tice. 40 It draws distinctions between categories of misconduct and sets
forth varying rules and time limits depending upon the nature of that
misconduct.41 For example, parties alleging misrepresentation, mis-
conduct, or fraud by an adverse party have one year from judgment to
request relief.42 Conversely, Rule 60(b) provides that parties alleging
that ajudgment against them was based on a prior judgment that has
been reversed or otherwise vacated must file within a reasonable
time.43
Even if a case does not fit into one of the numbered provisions of
Rule 60(b) (1)-(5), a court may grant relief under Rule 60(b) (6), the
deadline-free "catch-all" provision that provides relief for "any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."44 The
37. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.2114] [g]. In addition, Rule 60(b)(6) offers re-
lief from judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judg-
ment." FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b) (6).
38. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.40. The fraud on the court exception and the
independent action provision are sometimes referred to as the "savings clauses" of Rule
60(b).
39. FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud are encompassed. See 47 Am. JUR. 2D Judg-
ments § 832 (1995). Intrinsic fraud typically refers to fraud between the parties, dealing
with issues in the case, considered and ruled upon by the court in the original action, such
as perjured testimony or forged instruments. See Fourth Circuit Review, 40 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 459, 554-55 n.4 (1983). Extrinsic fraud typically refers to "fraud on the court," such as
fraud present in obtaining ajudgment that denies the opposing party a fair hearing on the
merits. See id.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud are encompassed. See 47
AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 832 (1995). Intrinsic fraud typically refers to fraud between the
parties, dealing with issues in the case, considered and ruled upon by the court in the
original action, such as perjured testimony or forged instruments. See Fourth Circuit Review,
supra note 42, at 554-55 n.4. Extrinsic fraud typically refers to "fraud on the court," such as
fraud present in obtaining ajudgment that denies the opposing party a fair hearing on the
merits. See id.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
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"catch-all" provision was not designed to provide a court with "unfet-
tered discretion to set aside a judgment in all cases. ' 45 Instead, the
provision is intended to apply only when the reason justifying relief is
not established in one of the more specific clauses of Rule 60(b).46 In
theory, this means that if the reason for relief could be considered
under one of the more specific clauses of Rule 60(b)(1)-(5), the
claim should not succeed under the deadline-free Rule 60(b) (6) .4 7
While Rule 60(b) lists several specific grounds for relief, the Rule
does not define the substantive law for vacating judgments. 48 Thus,
"although the relief provided by the Rule may ultimately result in an
award of some kind or financial gain through the opportunity to reliti-
gate,' 49 the actual Rule 60(b) is purely a means to litigation, offering
little in terms of substantive guidance for the practitioner considering
such a claim.
2. The Scope of Fraud on the Court Under Rule 60(b)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempt to distinguish fraud
of an adverse party-a ground for relief under Rule 60(b) (3) -from
fraud on the court. A Rule 60(b) (3) motion alleging fraud of an ad-
verse party would typically be filed in the court in which the judgment
was rendered, and the motion must be made within one year from the
date judgment was entered.5 0 However, in what has become known as
one of two "savings clauses" of Rule 60(b), the Rule expressly excludes
from its purview and time restrictions the inherent power of a court to
set aside a judgment procured through fraud on the court.51
A fraud on the court claim hinges on the conduct's effect on the
judicial process-the fraud alleged must involve injury to more than a
single litigant and must seriously affect the integrity of the adjudica-
tion process. 52 Examples include bribery of a judge, jury tampering,
or hiring an attorney whose sole value to the case is the attorney's
intimate or criminal relationship with the judge.53 These types of
claims are distinguishable from fraud between parties, which, even if
45. 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.48[1].
46. See 12 id.
47. See 12 id.
48. See 12 id. § 60.20.
49. 12 id.
50. See 12 id. § 60.81[1] [a].
51. See 12 id. § 60.40; see also Deborah Roy, Note, The Sixth Circuit's Unprecedented Re-
opening of Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 737, 748 (1994).
52. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.21[4] [a].
53. See 12 id.
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involving perjury, do not constitute fraud on the court.5 4 As Professor
Moore notes, " [i]f fraud on the court were to be given a broad inter-
pretation that encompassed virtually all forms of fraudulent miscon-
duct between the parties, judgments would never be final and the
time limitations of Rule 60(b) would be meaningless."55 In practice,
even "fairly despicable conduct" should not fit within the definition of
fraud on the court.56 Examples of conduct that has not qualified as
fraud on the court include false answers to discovery requests and fail-
ures to disclose, which have been treated rather as affirmative perjury
by an ordinary witness.57
No formal requirements guide litigants in asserting fraud on the
court claims.58 Other than requiring notice and an opportunity to be
heard, the United States Supreme Court has left the courts with the
power to devise their own appropriate procedures. 59 This lack of pro-
cedural certainty has created inconsistencies, although a few patterns
do emerge. For instance, while no time limit or laches applies to fraud
on the court claims, courts in practice will consider the delays in-
volved.60 The longer the delays, the more difficult it is to set aside the
judgment.61 Also, fraud on the court claims typically must be estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence. 62
3. Subtle Distinctions Between Types of Fraud Make the Fraud on
the Court Doctrine an Attractive Nuisance
Because Rule 60(b) (3) distinguishes misrepresentation, miscon-
duct, or fraud of an adverse party from fraud on the court,63 the ter-
minology litigants use in framing their claims has become increasingly
important.64 The substance of a Rule 60(b) motion is supposed to
control over its form or label. 65 Professor Moore notes that "a label on
a motion may never be used to make a mockery of the time limits
within Rule 60(b) itself."66 For instance, Moore asserts that Rule
54. See 12 id. § 60.21[4] [c].
55. 12 id.
56. 12 id.
57. See 12 id.
58. See 12 id. § 60.2114] [f].
59. See 12 id.
60. See 12 id. § 60.21 [4] [g].
61. See 12 id.
62. See 12 id. § 60.21[4] [h].
63. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
64. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.64.
65. See 12 id. § 60.64.
66. 12 id.
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60(b) (1) motions may not be disguised as Rule 60(b) (6) motions to
avoid time limits. 67 These guidelines, however, have not deterred
some litigants from attempting to cast their motions under one of the
deadline-free provisions of Rule 60, regardless of the substance of the
claims.68 Thus, while Moore asserts that nomenclature is not impor-
tant and that the label a party attaches to its motion should not con-
trol whether the party receives relief,69 Rule 60(b)'s terminology has
perplexed both litigants and courts, and "faulty labeling" has at times
enabled parties to litigate for years before courts rectify the
problem.70
Thus, even though a court should not consider a complaint that
simply restates claims made in a previously dismissed suit as a motion
for relief, some courts struggle to separate legitimate Rule 60(b) mo-
tions from impermissible attempts to re-litigate. 7' In a sense, the "sav-
ings clauses" provided in Rule 60 have become an attractive nuisance
of sorts for disappointed litigants.72
4. Rule 60 Limits the Scope of Independent Actions
Through its "savings clauses," Rule 60(b) also preserved the so-
called "independent actions," yet another method available for setting
aside certain judgments. 73 According to Professor Moore, indepen-
67. See 12 id. § 60.64 n.9 (citing Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 277 (lst Cir.
1993)).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
69. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.64.
70. See, e.g., Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000).
71. Conversely, some courts will construe a Rule 60 (b) motion as if it were a deadline-
free independent action. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.64 n.6 (citing Weldon v. United
States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1995)).
72. See generally Roy, supra note 51, at 752.
73. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.80; see also Roy, supra note 51, at 748. While
fraud is the most common ground for maintaining an independent action, independent
actions are not appropriate for all types of fraud claims. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12,
§ 60.81 [b]. For instance, even though the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud
was explicitly eliminated in Rule 60(b), most courts continue to observe the distinction in
independent actions, allowing only claims for judgments procured by extrinsic fraud. See
12 id. Prior to the adoption of the federal rules, the general rule was that relief through an
independent action for fraud could only be given for extrinsic fraud. See United States v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878). Extrinsic fraud has been defined as "fraud that actually
prevented an issue from being joined or a party from making a valid claim or defense." See
12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.81 [b] (quoting Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1358 (4th Cir. 1982)). For instance, conspiring with an oppo-
nent to the detriment of a client constitutes extrinsic fraud. See 12 id. § 60.81 [b] [i] n.5
(citing Bizzell v. Hemingway, 548 F.2d 505, 507 (4th Cir. 1977) ("Equitable relief has long
been granted where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a
party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells
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dent actions are "usually reserved for situations that do not meet the
requirements" for a motion under the numbered paragraphs of Rule
60(b).74 Typically, litigants resort to independent actions for one of
three reasons: (1) the fraud alleged is not chargeable to an adverse
party; (2) the parties seek relief from a court other than the rendering
court; or (3) the one-year time limit has expired. 75
Laches applies to independent actions, barring relief when the
litigant has prejudiced the opposing party because he has not exer-
cised due diligence. 76 Unlike Rule 60(b) motions, however, indepen-
dent actions, such as fraud on the court claims, are not limited by the
one-year statute of limitations under Rule 60(b). 77 In addition, inde-
pendent actions need not be brought in the court that rendered the
judgment in question. 78 That said, the historical remedy of an inde-
pendent action is extremely limited, and federal courts are instructed
to set aside the judgments of another court only "with great reluc-
tance."79 Nonetheless, the lack of any firm time limitation and the
ability to bring claims in a different court make independent actions,
such as fraud on the court, an attractive nuisance for unscrupulous
litigants whose Rule 60(b) (3) claims are procedurally barred. As such,
courts have treated independent actions and fraud on the court
claims in the same manner.8 0
out his client's interest to the other side.")). Nevertheless, most courts refuse to permit
equitable relief for intrinsic fraud, which has been defined as fraud involving issues already
.presented and considered in the judgment assailed." Fourth Circuit Review, supra note 42,
at 554-55 n.4. See also 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.81[b] [ii]. Intrinsic fraud focuses on
the concept that "the truth of testimony and evidence was the very purpose of the litigation
process," and therefore a judgment should not be reopened merely because one party
failed to prepare for trial, or inadequately cross-examined a witness. 12 id. at § 60.81 [b] [ii].
Thus, in most cases, perjury at trial, or in discovery proceedings, or in presentation of false
documents in evidence may not serve as the basis of an independent action in equity. See
12 id. However, these subtle distinctions in terminology have proven to be problematic,
and so as a practical matter, many courts simply try to measure whether the parties seeking
relief previously enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims. See 12 id.
74. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.81[1] [a].
75. See 12 id.
76. See 12 id. § 60.83 n.5 (citing Lockwood v. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625, 629 (D.C. 1969)).
77. FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b).
78. See 12 MooRiE, supra note 12, § 60.21[2].
79. 12 id.
80. See infra, text accompanying notes 81-109.
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C. The Supreme Court Sets the Parameters of the Fraud on the
Court Doctrine: Hazel-Atlas and Beggerly
In addition to drawing on Rule 60(b), litigants invoking the fraud
on the court doctrine in federal courts often rely on Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.8 1 In Hazel-Atlas, the United States Supreme
Court laid out a litmus test that embodies many Rule 60 concepts.8 2 In
fact, most of the principles used in analyzing fraud on the court claims
today are derived from Hazel-Atlas, the first in a long line of opinions
holding that courts possess an inherent power to reverse judgments in
cases of after-discovered fraud. 3
Nine years after the Hazel-Atlas Company was found liable for
patent infringement, the company learned that fraudulent activities
by Hartford-Empire and their attorneys had influenced both the
United States Patent Office and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.8 4
Though the statute of limitations had expired, Hazel-Atlas sought to
overturn the Third Circuit's decision, claiming that Hartford had
fraudulently procured the decision holding Hazel-Atlas liable for pat-
ent infringement. 85
Specifically, Hazel-Atlas discovered that after Hartford's patent
application for a glass-fashioning machine encountered opposition
from the Patent Office, Hartford officials and attorneys prepared a
spurious article that called the device a "remarkable advance" and had
the article published in a trade journal under the alleged authorship
of a disinterested expert.8 6 Hartford's application for the patent was
subsequently granted, and Hartford then brought suit against Hazel-
Atlas for patent infringement. 87
Hazel-Atlas contended that the bogus article was used to influ-
ence the Third Circuit and argued that after the lower court had
found no infringement, one of the attorneys who helped publish the
bogus article drew it to the appellate court's attention, to great ef-
81. 322 U.S. 238 (1944) (overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
429 U.S. 17 (1976)).
82. Id.
83. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE & PROCEDURE CIVIL § 2870 (2d ed. 1995); see also Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation,
Construction and Application of Provision of Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: That
Rule Does Not Limit Power of Federal District Court to Set Aside Judgment for "Fraud Upon the
Court," 19 A.L.R. FED. 761, 764 (1974).
84. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 239.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 240.
87. Id. at 241.
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fect.8 8 As the Supreme Court noted, the Third Circuit quoted copi-
ously from the article to prove the patent's revolutionary elements
and ultimately held that Hazel-Atlas had infringed the patent.8 9
The Supreme Court held that because the judgment was not
merely the result of perjured testimony, but of a "deliberately planned
and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the Patent Office
but the Circuit Court of Appeals," it could not be upheld.90 The Court
further noted that Hartford's conduct, which it described as tamper-
ing with justice, involved more than an injury to a single litigant.9 1 As
such, the Court remanded the case with directions to reinstate the
district court's finding that the patent had not been infringed, a judg-
ment that was twelve years old when the Supreme Court issued its
opinion.9 2
In the years since Hazel-Atlas, "the federal courts have struggled
with the definition of 'fraud on the court' in the context of Rule
60(b)."9 3 In fact, in United States v. Beggerly,9 4 the United States Su-
preme Court recently conceded that, with respect to independent ac-
tions, Rule 60(b)'s "precise contours are somewhat unclear."9 5
Nevertheless, federal courts have generally agreed that "because the
equitable doctrine utilized in Hazel-Atlas allows courts to overturn set-
tled judgments and orders at any time," the doctrine should be nar-
rowly construed and confined to the most egregious cases.96
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that only
judgments that would result in a "grave miscarriage of justice" should
satisfy the requirements of an independent action for relief.97 In
United States v. Beggerly,98 landowners sued to set aside a twelve-year-old
property agreement.99 The landowners had originally signed a con-
tract to sell the land at issue to the federal government, but the gov-
ernment backed out when its lawyers said the land, which was part of
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 245, 250.
91. Id. at 246 ("It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard
the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with
the good order of society.").
92. Id. at 251.
93. P'ship Placements, Inc. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 722 A.2d 837, 844 (D.C. 1998).
94. 524 U.S. 38 (1998).
95. Id. at 45.
96. P'ship Placements, Inc., 722 A.2d at 844.
97. Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 47.
98. 524 U.S. 38 (1998).
99. Id. at 39.
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the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, had never been privately owned. 100
The initial lawsuit ended with a 1982 property settlement in which the
family received cash, and the government obtained the land. 10 1
Despite the settlement, the landowners continued to research
their claim of title, hiring a genealogical record specialist to conduct
research at the National Archives. 1°2 After the genealogist discovered
evidence of private ownership to support the landowners' claim, the
property owners asked a federal judge to set aside the settlement, re-
questing compensation for the government's twelve-year "taking" of
the property. 03 While the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Mississippi granted the government's motion to dis-
miss, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, directing the district
court to reopen the judgment and quiet title in favor of the landown-
ers.104 The appellate court held that because the government had told
the landowners and the district court that there was no evidence of
private ownership, and therefore the landowners' inability to prove
their title was caused by the government's failure to produce docu-
ments, equity required the court to correct the injustice under these
"extraordinary and unusual circumstances."' 0 5 The court of appeals
concluded that under these facts, the property owners had met Rule
60(b)'s requirements for an independent action. 106
The United States Supreme Court, however, disagreed, and in
1998 held that the landowners' claim could not be re-litigated as an
independent action for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). 10 7
The Court held that litigants must not be allowed to subvert the one-
year statute of limitations for Rule 60 actions through the indepen-
dent action savings clause, clarifying that such actions "should be
available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." 10 8 The Court
held that:
If relief may be obtained through an independent action in a case
such as this, where the most that may be charged against the Gov-
ernment is a failure to furnish relevant information that would at
100. Id. at 40; see also Richard Carelli, Dispute over Horn Island Property Not a Federal Case,
Justices Say, DAILY REc. (Balt.),June 9, 1998, at 2C, available at LEXIS, News Library, Daily
Record File.
101. Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 39.
102. Id. at 40-41.
103. Id. at 41; see also Carelli, supra note 100, at 2C.
104. See Beggerly v. United States, 114 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 1997).
105. Id. at 488.
106. Id. at 487.
107. Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 47.
108. Id.
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best form the basis for a Rule 60(b) (3) motion, the strict one-year
time limit on such motions would be set at naught. 10 9
D. Fraud on the Court Faces Similar Obstacles in State Systems
Litigants in state courts also invoke the fraud on the court doc-
trine. 110 While many states have adopted rules of civil procedure
modeled on Rule 60(b), the same "catch-all" loophole that opens the
door to misuse in the federal system appears in most state courts rules
as well.I 1 1 A few states operate without any procedural rules relating to
the doctrine, turning instead to inherent authority and equitable doc-
trines to sort out fraud-based claims.11 2 Regardless of the procedural
framework, state case law demonstrates that, as in the federal courts,
state courts also face cases in which litigants are turning to the doc-
trine for an extra "bite at the apple." 1 3
While the evidence in each fraud-based claim must be individu-
ally assessed, the general judicial approaches to the doctrine can be
109. Id. at 46.
110. For example, Florida courts have:
[S]truggled to define the situations in which an independent action will be al-
lowed, and the differences between fraud contestable within one year of the entry
of final judgment by motion under [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.540(b) (3)
and the types of fraud which can be a basis for an independent action after one
year.
C. Timothy Gray, Comment, Rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure: In Search of An
Equitable Standard for Relief from Fraud, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 851, 852 (1985).
111. The state rules of civil procedure pertaining to reopening judgments on the
ground of fraud on the court are: ALA. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3);
Amiz. R. Ctv. P. 60(c) (3); ARK. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (4); COLO. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2); DEL. R. Crv. P.
60(b) (3); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) (3); HAw. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3); IDAHo R. CIV. P. 60(b) (3);
IND. R. Civ. P. 60(B) (3); lowA R. Civ. P. 1.1012(2); KAN. R. Crv. P. 60-260(b) (3); Ky. R. CIv.
P. 60.02(d); LA. CODE CiV. PRoc. ANN. art. 2004 (West 2004); ME. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3); MD.
R. Crv. P. 2-535(b); MAss. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(3); MICH. R. Clv. P. 2.612(C)(1)(c); MINN. R.
Crv. P. 60.02(c); Miss. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(1); Mo. R. Civ. P. 74.06(b)(2); MONT. R. Crv. P.
60(b)(3); NEV. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(3); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:50-1(c); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-060(B) (3);
N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3); N.D. R. Crv. P. 60(b) (iii); OHIO R. Crv. P. 60(B) (3); OR. R. Crv. P.
71 (B) (1) (c); R.I. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3); S.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3); S.D. R. Civ. P. 15-6-60(b) (3);
TENN. R. Crv. P. 60.02(2); UTAH R. Crv. P. 60(b) (3); VT. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(3); WASH. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(4); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); Wis. R. Civ. P. 806.07(1)(c); Wvo. R. Civ. P.
60(b) (3).
112. California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia do not have specific rules of civil procedure
relating to reopening judgments on the basis of fraud.
113. See, e.g., Van Sickle v. Van Sickle, Doc. No. 970339639S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1718, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999), where the court disallowed a reopening of a separa-
tion agreement on the basis of fraud. Fraud also becomes an issue in arbitration proceed-
ings, as many statutes allow for reopening of arbitration awards on the basis of fraud. See,
e.g., Pocket Change Kahunaville, Inc. v. Kahunaville of Eastwood Mall, Inc., Doc. No.
19852-NC, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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gleaned from recent state court cases and treatises.1 14 Generally, state
courts, as their federal counterparts, perceive fraud on the court as a
unique brand of deception, distinguishable from misrepresentation,
misconduct, or fraud on an adverse party. 115 The fraud must typically
defile the court itself or be perpetrated by an officer of the court "so
that the judicial machinery cannot perform" in its usual impartial
manner.116
To define the specific circumstances that rise to the level of
"fraud on the court," a host of state courts have turned to the Restate-
ment of Judgments ("Restatement") .117 The Restatement attempts to
describe the circumstances in which judgments can be avoided, yet
concedes that it is especially difficult to establish criteria "that cannot
so easily be met as to create open opportunity for relitigation, but
which are not so demanding that plain cases of fraud cannot be reme-
died."" 8 The Restatement notes that the fraud-based doctrines have
not been consistently applied: "It is ... clear that there is discord in
the underlying judicial attitudes toward relief on the basis of fraud,
[with] some courts being more responsive than others." 119 That being
said, the Restatement suggests that the critical considerations are
whether the claim of fraud is "well substantiated," and whether the
victim in the original action had pursued "reasonable precautions"
against deception. 120
With that caveat, the Restatement goes on to provide a framework
for litigants considering fraud on the court claims. To succeed, the
Restatement suggests that a litigant must show that the judgment in
question resulted from corruption of, or duress upon, the court, or
upon the losing attorney.' 2 ' Further, a party seeking relief must have:
(1) acted with due diligence; (2) asserted the claim with such particu-
larity as to indicate that it is well founded and may be proved by clear
and convincing evidence; and (3) when the claim is based on falsity of
evidence, show that he has made a reasonable effort in the original
action to ascertain the truth of the matter.122
114. See Jonathan M. Stern, Untangling a Tangled Web Without Trial: Using the Court's
Inherent Powers and Rules to Deny a Perjuring Litigant His Day in Court, 66 J. AmR L. & COM.
1251, 1255-56 (2001).
115. See Anderson & Holober, supra note 9, at 699-700.
116. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 887 (1995).
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 (1982).
118. Id. § 70 cmt. c.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 70(1)(a).
122. Id. § 70(2).
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Comments to the Restatement also suggest that a party alleging
fraud on the court must satisfy four specific elements to obtain re-
lief.12 3 First, the party must demonstrate that the fabrication or con-
cealment was a material basis for the judgment and not merely
relevant to a peripheral issue.124 Second, the litigant must show that
he adequately pursued means for discovering the truth. 125 Third, he
must demonstrate that he showed diligence after judgment in discov-
ering the fraud as soon as could reasonably be expected. 126 And fi-
nally, before being allowed to present his case, the party seeking relief must
demonstrate that he has a substantial case to present, one that offers
clear and convincing proof that the evidence underlying the judg-
ment was indeed fabricated or concealed. 127 According to the Restate-
ment, this "heavy burden of proof is an important measure of
protection against attacks on honestly procured judgments."1 28
H. Litigant Abuse of the Fraud on the Court Doctrine
Because the fraud on the court doctrine contains so much sub-
tlety and is particularly susceptible to litigant abuse, it is crucial that
courts approach fraud on the court claims with a keen eye. This Part
reveals, however, that some litigant abuse is passing through both
state and federal trial courts. Even though appellate courts are catch-
ing these abuses and dismissing the cases accordingly, these journeys
through the courts are costly and must be put to an end earlier. This
Part shows that many trial court judges have allowed extensive post-
judgment litigation in improperly reopened cases to the great detri-
ment of both the finality of judgments and the pocketbooks of liti-
gants who have been forced to contest the frivolous claims.
A. Courts' Struggles with Fraud on the Court: Federal Cases
The parameters set by the Supreme Court in Hazel-Atlas and Beg-
gerly seem strict and clear. Nonetheless, litigants in federal courts con-
tinue to turn to Rule 60(b) in attempts to reopen final judgments,
even when their circumstances clearly do not rise to the Hazel-Atlas
level.
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Despite the recent guidance from the United States Supreme
Court, some federal courts continue to grapple with Rule 60 and the
fraud on the court doctrine.
For instance, in 2000, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
posed of a litigant's attempts to reopen a judgment in a case that the
court called "precisely the sort of repetitive litigation that the doctrine
of resjudicata aims to prevent."129 The appeal, which included a Rule
60(b) claim, emerged from a "procedural morass" of six court orders
involving a bankrupt real estate agent dissatisfied with her creditor's
decision to sell a parcel of real estate.130 After the bankruptcy court
dismissed the plaintiffs motion to reject the real estate contract, ex-
tensive litigation ensued.131
The plaintiff filed a separate action in federal district court, this
time alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duty under Rule 60(b).132
The district court rejected the plaintiffs Rule 60(b) claim, holding
that the plaintiff failed to allege any affirmative misrepresentations or
a duty by the purchaser to disclose and added that she had failed to
show how she or the bankruptcy estate suffered harm. 133 After the
fraud defense failed in federal court, the plaintiff returned to bank-
ruptcy court, this time alleging fraud arising out of conduct in con-
nection with the property sale. 134 The court rejected the claim,
holding that the fraud provision of Rule 60(b) (3) had not been in-
voked in time and finding the plaintiffs Rule 60(b) (6) claim to be
inapplicable. 13 5 Finally, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
resjudicata applied and found no basis for a fraud exception or 60(b)
claim.'3 6 "Nearly eight years after the initial bankruptcy proceedings
in this case," the court held, "it is high time for this matter to come to
an end."137
129. See Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000).
130. See id. at 1165. The Tenth Circuit described the extensive procedural history as
follows: In re Plotner, No. 92-17405-LN (Bankr. W.D. Okla. June 16, 1994) ("Plotner I");
Plotner v. AT&T, 172 B.R 337 (W.D. Okla. 1994) ("Plotner I Appeal"); Plotner v. AT&T
Corp., No. CIV-95-50-R (W.D. Okla. July 30, 1996); ("Plotner II"); Plotner v. AT&T Corp.,
No. 96-6212, 1997 WL 234787 (10th Cir. May 7, 1997) ("Plotner II Appeal"); Plotner v.
AT&T Corp. (In rePlotner), No. 92-17405-TS, Adv. No. 96-1220-TS (Bankr.W.D. Okla. Aug.
6, 1997 ("Plotner III"); Plotner v. AT&T Corp., No. CIV-97-1832-M (W.D. Okla. Mar 17,
1999) ("Plotner III Appeal"). Id. at 1165-67.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1165-66.
133. See id. at 1166.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 1174.
137. Id. at 1175.
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Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of a fraud-
based claim in 2002 that began "as a wrongful death action, but
detoured into a procedural thicket."1 38 After a mother failed in her
diversity suit against her deceased son's hospital and physicians, she
retained new counsel, and together they "embarked upon a number
of steps designed to reinvigorate the wrongful death suit that had
been dismissed." 139 One of those paths included the filing of a Rule
60(b) claim. 140 While the Rule 60(b) (6) catch-all was intended for ex-
ceptional or extraordinary circumstances not covered by the first five
numbered clauses of Rule 60(b), the district court, without explicitly
considering those sections, decided that the exception applied, and
that the order in question could be amended so that "substantial jus-
tice w[ould] be served." 141 On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit held
that claims of attorney error and strategic miscalculation did not meet
the Rule's stringent requirements and therefore reversed the district
court. 142 The court explained:
[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is circumscribed by public policy favor-
ing finality ofjudgments and termination of litigation. This is espe-
cially true in an application of subsection (6) of Rule 60(b), which
applies only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which
are not addressed by the first five numbered clauses of the Rule.
This is because almost every conceivable ground for relief is cov-
ered under the other subsections of Rule 60(b). Consequently,
courts must apply Rule 60(b) (6) relief only in unusual and ex-
treme situations where principles of equity mandate relief.143
In another recent example, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia is considering an action in
which heirs of a landowner seek to undo a 150-year chain of title to
valuable land and mineral rights in southern West Virginia.144 The
plaintiffs', heirs of a landowner, claim that a group of oil and gas com-
panies have wrongfully mined and drilled wells on the property in
question-property that they believe was obtained through fraudulent
means. 145
138. McCurry ex. rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 588
(6th Cir. 2002).
139. Id. at 590.
140. Id. at 591.
141. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
142. Id. at 598.
143. Id. at 592 (quoting Blue Diamond Coal v. Trs. of UMWA Combined Benefit Fund,
249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001)).
144. Fourth Amended Complaint at 6, Harless v. Pen Coal Corp., No. 3:01-0470 (S.D.
W. Va. 2004).
145. See id. 62, 63, 74, 75.
Summer 20051
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
In their pleadings, the plaintiffs claim their ancestor acquired the
land by adverse possession from 1857 to 1886, when he constructed a
log house on the property and paid taxes on it. 1 46 In the 1870s, the
ancestor lost title to the land via an ejectment action in which the
heirs claim that land speculators committed fraud upon the district
court.147 The heirs argued that the attorney for the landowner was
mired in conflicts of interest with land speculators and did not raise
proper defenses. 48 According to the plaintiffs, the effect of this
"fraud upon the Court and parties was to rob and steal large amounts
of valuable land and the minerals contained thereon."1 49 To over-
come the time-lapse issue, the plaintiffs asserted that the fraud perpet-
uated on the court in the 1874 ejectment action was not discovered by
the heirs until the defendants began to mine the property in 2000
(despite the recorded chain of title). 150
The defendants have argued that the action was filed more than a
century too late and noted how the passage of time has harmed their
ability to obtain evidence that would refute the allegations of fraud. 151
In addition to citing their concerns over the numerous property trans-
actions that have relied upon the judgment at issue, the defendants
highlighted the difficulties (including the hiring of genealogists152)
associated with litigating a century-old case:
[T]he evidentiary prejudice to the [defendants], well over a cen-
tury after the alleged fraud, is staggering. Had the plaintiffs' prede-
cessors made inquiry and taken action in the 1870s or 1880s, many
of the persons alleged to have been involved in a conspiracy to
defraud would have been alive to explain their actions and to be
subjected to scrutiny and questioning. Fuller documentation would
have existed. Memories would have been comparatively fresh.
None of this is the case today. 153
Nonetheless, the district court rejected the defendants' motion to
dismiss, and the lawsuit proceeded to the summary judgment
146. See id. 53.
147. See id. 62.
148. See id. 65, 66, 76, 90, 94.
149. Id. 104.
150. See id. 1 128.
151. Harless v. Pen Coal Corp., No. 3:01-0470, slip op. at 6 (S.D. W. Va. 2001).
152. Interview with Howard M. Persinger,Jr., Attorney for Defendant Pocahontas Land
Corp. (June 24, 2004) (notes on file with author).
153. Memorandum of Law of Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. and Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp. in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 24, Harless v.
Pen Coal Corp., No. 3:01-0470 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (on file with author).
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phase. 154 In seeking summary judgment, the defendants noted the
"enormous costs imposed by this litigation. " 15 5
B. Courts' Struggles with Fraud on the Court: State Cases
Similar to federal courts, state courts also have struggled to prop-
erly apply the doctrine. 156 Furthermore, the equitable case-by-case
analysis adopted by most state courts makes it difficult to predict the
outcome in any individual matter. For instance, while older appellate
decisions upholding dismissals with prejudice for fraud on the court
were outnumbered by decisions reversing such dismissals as too se-
vere, several recent Florida decisions show an increased willingness to
dismiss with prejudice157 -a result that many practitioners consider to
be "the ultimate sanction."'158 An experienced Florida lawyer recently
explained some of the struggles inherent in representing clients
whose judgments have been challenged on the basis of fraud:
What precisely is fraud on the court? When is conduct sufficiently
egregious to distinguish it from arguable forgetfulness or misun-
derstanding? How much bad conduct is enough? Does one terrible
and indisputable lie about a fact central to the case suffice? What
about a whole series of lies .... What if the misconduct is entirely
procedural .... [like] obstruct[ing] discovery by failing to comply
with court orders? There are no simple answers to these questions,
nor can there be. Each case must be assessed and adjudicated ac-
cording to its own unique facts. 159
Several recent state court matters further illustrate the courts'
struggles with the doctrine, particularly when faced with unsubstanti-
ated allegations of fraud. For example, the Pennsylvania case de-
scribed in the opening paragraphs of this Article demonstrates how
154. Harless v. Pen Coal Corp., No. 3:01-0470, slip op. at 6-7 (S.D. W. Va. 2001).
155. Memorandum of Law of Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. and Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp. in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Harless v.
Pen Coal Corp., No. 3:01-0470 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (on file with author). In June 2004, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia (Huntington Divi-
sion) held that the allegations of lawyer misconduct did not rise to the level of "fraud upon
the court." Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed Aug. 3, 2004, at 9 (on file with
author).
156. For example, Florida courts have "struggled to define the situations in which an
independent action will be allowed, and the differences between fraud contestable within
one year of the entry of final judgment by motion under [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure]
1.540(b) (3) and the types of fraud which can be a basis for an independent action after
one year." Gray, supra note 110, at 852.
157. See Destafano v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 28 Fla. L. Weekly D1077 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003); Long v. Swofford, 805 So. 2d 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
158. Kolinski, supra note 17, at 17.
159. Id. at 16.
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ambiguous drafting, coupled with mere allegations of fraud can thrust
a judgment back into litigation. 160 There, the previously unsuccessful
litigants convinced a trial court judge to investigate rather weak allega-
tions of fraud, and three seemingly final judgments subsequently fell
under attack. 161
As in many cases in which fraud on the court is alleged, the Penn-
sylvania case dates back many decades.' 62 The controversy stemmed
from a 1929 deed of trust with an unclear distribution scheme. In
1992, the settlor's heirs filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment to
clarify the meaning of the ambiguous phrase.163 After extensive brief-
ing and argument, the trial court determined that the trust should be
divided into eight shares, and in 1994, the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania upheld the trial court's decision. 164
In 1998, several beneficiaries launched a new effort to re-litigate
the trust's meaning. 165 To avoid the bar of res judicata, they con-
tended that fraud had been perpetrated on the lower court.166 The
lower court dismissed the case, finding the fraud claims to be ground-
less. 167 Nevertheless, in 2000, when the Trustee presented a Petition
for Distribution to divide the trust into eight separate shares, the same
group of beneficiaries filed objections.' 6s Once again anticipating the
defense of res judicata, the litigants made the same allegations of
fraud that had been dismissed in 1998.169
In this third round of litigation, a new judge referred the case to
a master who allowed an amended pleading. The beneficiaries then
filed a 285-paragraph document that repeated the terms "fraud,"
160. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
161. See In re Deed of Trust of Grant McCargo, Nos. 374, 375, 377 WDA 2003, at 7-10
(Pa. Super Ct. Dec. 23, 2003).
162. See Torsten Ove, Heirs to Fortune Are at Odds over Control of the Wealth Grease Baron
Leaves; Slippery Legal Slope, PI-rSBURGH POsT-GAZETrE, July 30, 2000, at A-8, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette file.
163. See In re Deed of Trust of Grant McCargo, 652 A.2d 1330, 1331 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994).
164. See id. at 1338.
165. See In re Deed of Trust of Grant McCargo, Nos. 374, 375, 377 WDA 2003, at 5-6
(Pa. Super Ct. Dec. 23, 2003).
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 7.
169. See id.
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"fraudulent," and "scheme to defraud" throughout. 170 The master
later rendered a second report that allowed discovery to proceed. 171
The case then went back to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania,
which ultimately rejected the attempt to overcome res judicata, hold-
ing that none of the allegations constituted the type of fraud necessary
to reopen the judgment.172 The court held that no litigant had fooled
any court into "adopting a flawed interpretation of the Trust lan-
guage" and rejected an argument that it should reopen its prior deci-
sions on the basis that the court was uninformed regarding previous
orders. 173 Further, the superior court rejected the claimants' attempt
to analogize their case to Hazel-Atlas.174 The court held that unlike in
Hazel-Atlas, where the Court did indeed rely on manufactured evi-
dence, there was not even an allegation of manufactured evidence in
this case-merely proof that the courts had considered and resolved a
question of law. 175
Other state courts have been grappling with fraud-related issues
in a variety of contexts, from estate litigation to tort claims to con-
tested arbitration awards. For example, in Massachusetts, after a mo-
torist had settled a property damage claim with the Commonwealth,
he brought a further claim for personal injuries received in the same
accident. 176 To overcome the bar against multiple claims under the
State Tort Claims Act, the motorist alleged fraud, as the Massachusetts
statute specifically provided that settlements procured by fraud would
not be subject to the statutory bar.'7 7 The motorist's fraud-based claim
rested on the premise that he had advised the Commonwealth that he
wanted only to settle his property damage claim and would pursue his
personal injury action after settling the property matter.'78 The court
held that because the claimant had not alleged that the Common-
wealth calculated to mislead him, his allegations did not support a
case based on fraud.' 79 The court noted that the affidavit did not con-
tain any references to what the Commonwealth had represented and
stated that the Commonwealth's settlement letter specifically stated
170. See Brief for Appellants, In re Deed of Trust of Grant McCargo, No. 377 WDA
2003, at 8 (Pa. Super Ct. Dec. 23, 2003).
171. See id. at 9.
172. Id. at 21.
173. Id. at 17-18.
174. Id. at 19-21.
175. Id.
176. See Knight v. Commonwealth, 709 N.E.2d 436, 437 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).
177. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 258, § 5 (2004).
178. Knight, 709 N.E.2d at 438.
179. Id.
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that the settlement would constitute a complete bar to further ac-
tion. °80 Thus, the court denied the fraud-based claim.' 81
In Florida, shareholders brought a motion to set aside an arbitra-
tion award for another shareholder who had been defamed by state-
ments regarding substance abuse and domestic violence.' 8 2 After the
circuit court entered the arbitration award in a final judgment, the
group moved to set aside the judgment on the ground of fraud, argu-
ing that the state's arbitration statute requires courts to vacate arbitra-
tion awards that are procured by "corruption, fraud or other undue
means." 8 3 The shareholders alleged that the sole shareholder had
committed perjury when he told the arbitration board that he was not
violent and did not have a drinking problem.'8 4 They submitted an
affidavit from the sole shareholder's ex-girlfriend, alleging that she
was physically assaulted by the shareholder and that she had witnessed
his abuse of alcohol and other illegal substances.18 5 The court held
that the evidence in the affidavit could have been discovered by due
diligence before the arbitration hearing and therefore was not permit-
ted. 8 6 The court further held that the evidence did not suffice to es-
tablish fraud in obtaining the arbitration award.'8 7 The court
reasoned that a claim of fraud should not result in "an opportunity to
obtain a second bite of the apple" to correct deficiencies of proof at
arbitration. 188
Hi. A Mechanism for Change
The federal and state cases discussed above demonstrate that liti-
gants have been misusing the fraud on the court doctrine, but there
are no easy fixes. While the Restatement suggests that courts should
not even consider reopening judgments unless litigants can show that
they have "substantial" cases to present, courts cannot seem to agree
upon what qualifies as "substantial." 189 As a result, the "savings
clauses" in Rule 60(b) and their state law analogs tempt litigants to
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Davenport v. Dimitrijevic, 857 So. 2d 957, 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
183. FLA. STAT. ch. 682.13(1)(a) (2003).
184. Davenport, 857 So. 2d at 960.
185. Id. at 960-61.
186. Id. at 962.
187. Id. at 962-63.
188. Id. at 962.
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. d (1982). This section suggests
that a substantial case would offer "clear and convincing proof that the evidence underly-
ing the judgment was indeed fabricated or concealed." Id.
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shoot for the moon, regardless of the strength of their claims, and
some courts have not adequately screened their insubstantial, frivo-
lous lawsuits.
Thus, it appears that both federal and state courts could benefit
from an improved process for dealing with fraud-based claims; courts
may even need specific mechanisms that require litigants to allege
outcome-determinative facts. The mechanisms could take many
forms, and as with any procedural change, each of the potential solu-
tions possesses benefits and challenges. 190 That being said, by drawing
analogies to existing procedures, a few possibilities come to light that
could ameliorate some of the common problems associated with the
doctrine.
A. Modification of Rule 60(b) and the Parallel State Rules of Civil
Procedure
An explicit, fraud-specific sanctions provision for Rule 60-with
teeth-could deter litigants and attorneys who might otherwise con-
sider filing a frivolous claim. A new subsection of Rule 60 (and the
corresponding state court rules) could be modeled on amended Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes sanctions
for litigants who file papers with the court for an improper purpose,
or whose allegations lack evidentiary support.191 The new rule could
specify that unless the litigant can provide facts that, if true, rise to the
level necessary to show a "fraud on the court," the filing would be
deemed to be frivolous, and sanctions could be imposed.
192
190. These suggestions are general, and an entire article could be devoted to develop-
ing each one. Rather than to exhaustively analyze each proposal, my goals are to stimulate
discussion and to demonstrate that any one (or combination of) these options might be an
improvement over the existing procedures.
191. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides,
inter alia, that litigants must certify to the court that any paper filed with the court is not
being presented for any improper purpose, and that the allegations and other factual con-
tentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have eviden-
tiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. Id. at
11 (b). If a litigant violates this test, sanctions may be imposed. Id. at R. 11 (c). As part of the
judiciary's 1993 reform of many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 was sub-
stantially amended. A major change was that the imposition of sanctions by the court for
violation of the Rule was changed from mandatory to discretionary. Id.
192. The modified rule could also incorporate aspects of Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which requires fraud to be plead with specificity, but has not been strictly
enforced. See 5A ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CivIL
§ 1301.1 (3d ed. 2004). Specifically, Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides: "(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice,
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."
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Of course, the suggestion to modify any procedural rule begets
numerous questions. 193 In this case, many of the same issues and ques-
tions raised in the debate over the 1993 amendments to Rule 11
would apply. For example, drafters would need to consider whether
the sanctions provision should be mandatory (as in the pre-1993 Rule
11) or discretionary.1 94 Also, drafters would need to consider whether
deterrence or compensation for defendants who are wrongly drawn
into re-litigation would be the primary goal of the rule.195 In the case
of Rule 11, the Rule states that a sanction should be "limited to what is
sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct
by others similarly situated."196 Here, while deterrence would clearly
be a goal, drafters would need to consider whether compensation is
an equally important goal, especially given the extraordinary cost asso-
ciated with evidence collection in decades-old matters.
Because the amendments to Rule 11 are still relatively new, the
debate over whether the amended rule is achieving its deterrent pur-
pose continues, and its impact on litigants is not conclusive. 197 Still,
some positive benefits have already been noted. Judges have found
creative ways to serve the amended Rule's deterrent purpose, such as
requiring offending attorneys to attend continuing legal education
courses or pay fines to fund scholarships for such classes. 198 Courts
also have issued reprimands and admonitions as sanctions.1 99 These
punishments may deter both current violators and future litigants.
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). However, because of the costs associated with researching decades-old
claims, the current Rule 9(b) is an ineffective deterrent for specious fraud on the court
claims, and a modified rule would have to take the particular problems associated with the
doctrine into account.
193. A complete analysis of the pros and cons and wording of any proposed change is
beyond the scope of this piece; my purpose here is to suggest that there are viable mecha-
nisms for improving the current state of the doctrine.
194. Former Rule 11 (b) stated that if a pleading, motion, or other paper were signed
in violation of the Rule, the court "upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose"
an appropriate sanction upon the violator. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) (1992) (amended
1993). A decision on whether to set aside ajudgment under Rule 60(b) is currently discre-
tionary. See 12 MOORE, supra note 12, § 60.22.
195. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIL PROCEDURE 11, at 11-12 (1989). This report was the
compilation of findings and recommendations of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Id.
196. FED. R. Cnv. P. 11(c)(2).
197. It has been difficult to determine the effect of Rule 11 because a court's written
ruling does not necessarily convey its impact on sanctioned litigants. See Theodore C. Hirt,
A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1007, 1039-40 (1999).
198. See id. at 1040.
199. See id. at 1041.
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Of course, the success of any rule modification would depend
largely on judicial enforcement. 200 As such, drafters of a new Rule 60
would benefit from analogizing to procedures that have been effec-
tively enforced. One successful model is the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),201 which, among other things,
requires specificity in pleading securities fraud.20 2 To overcome con-
cerns that federal courts were not effectively applying Federal Rule
9(b) (which requires specificity in pleading) to prevent frivolous fil-
ings in the securities fraud area, Congress amended the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 to include unique pleading requirements for
private litigants alleging securities fraud. 203 If a complaint asserts that
a defendant made misleading statements under the securities law, the
PSLRA requires that "the complaint shall specify each statement al-
leged to have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading. '" 20 4 Similarly, litigants alleging fraud on the
court could be required to specify which specific facts could support
their allegations and also how those allegations could result in a find-
ing of outcome-determinative fraud. By combining a sanctions provi-
sion with a true requirement for specificity in pleading, courts would
more easily weed out frivolous claims, and litigants would be deterred
from filing bogus complaints as a result of successful judicial enforce-
ment of a modified rule.
B. Improved Education of Trial Court Judges
The cases and commentaries cited above demonstrate that courts
have not consistently applied the fraud on the court doctrine. There
are multiple reasons for the jurists' struggles. Three of the most com-
mon problems associated with adjudicating these cases include: (1)
the myriad ways in which litigants raise the doctrine (e.g., litigants do
not always frame their claims as Rule 60 (b) actions or as independent
200. Some courts are showing an increased willingness to "hand out real pain" to liti-
gants who are perceived to be abusing the legal system. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Fairy Tales
Won't Put the Tax Court to Sleep, WASH. PosT, June 27, 2004, at F5. In June 2004, the Tax
Court added a $20,000 penalty to the more than $300,000 in taxes and penalties already
assessed against a Florida software engineer by the IRS. See id. In the same month, a federal
court in Nevada held famed tax evader and author Irwin Schiff, who had counseled read-
ers that paying taxes is voluntary, liable for more than $2 million in taxes and penalties in a
case involving unpaid taxes for 1979 to 1985. See id.
201. Public Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
202. See id.
203. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 192, § 1301.1.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000).
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actions, but sometimes raise the issue through an equitable claim, or
as an exception to the doctrine of resjudicata); (2) the issues inher-
ent in evaluating decades-old evidence; and, (3) the relative infre-
quency of legitimate fraud on the court claims.20 5 Despite these
difficulties, trial court judges are the first line of defense against mis-
use of the doctrine. While it may be easy to sympathize with litigants
who include allegations of unconscionable fraud in their filings, trial
courtjudges must remain vigilant. Education about misuse of the doc-
trine, particularly in jurisdictions where no procedural rules exist,
could help judges in identifying and extinguishing specious claims
early in the litigation process. This education initiative, when coupled
with the improved filing requirements suggested above, could help
judges in making fair decisions more efficiently.
As noted above, substance should trump form when it comes to
Rule 60(b) motions, but in order for the Rule's time limits to have
meaning, courts must carefully examine that substance. For instance,
if a motion is essentially based on a claim of mistake within the one-
year time limit of Rule 60(b) (1), courts must stop litigants from assert-
ing the "catch-all" provision of Rule 60(b) (6).2 0 6 More than just se-
mantics, this terminology issue has real consequence for litigants, and
therefore courts must carefully wade through pleadings to determine
whether an attorney has properly labeled the claim.
Of course, some courts have done so with little trouble. For exam-
ple, in Cotto v. United States,207 family members of an injured minor
tried to revive a Federal Tort Claims Act action sixteen months after
the district court had dismissed the case. 20 8 The court rejected their
Rule 60(b) claims, holding that the motion should have been labeled
as a Rule 60(b) (1) claim for excusable neglect, rather than as a
60(b) (6) "catch-all" motion. 20 9 The court held that the "plaintiffs' at-
tempt to garb their motion in the raiment of clause (6) runs aground
on the bedrock principle that clause (6) may not be used as a vehicle
for circumventing clauses (1) through (5)."210
205. While this Article demonstrates that there is certainly a critical mass of these types
of cases, discussions with practitioners indicate that fraud on the court claims are not an
everyday occurrence. This may be one reason why some judges struggle when confronted
with the doctrine.
206. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.64.
207. 993 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1993).
208. Id. at 277.
209. Id. at 278.
210. Id.
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Similarly, the First Circuit also cut through an improper Rule
60(b) (6) claim when a teamsters union invoked the rule in an effort
to undo a judgment.211 The union had filed a complaint for vacation
pay allegedly owed to its members, but after the defendants sought
summary judgment and the union failed to respond, the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the motion.212
More than a year later, the union filed a Rule 60(b) (6) motion to
vacate the judgment.213
In analyzing the union's claim, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that the court need not consider a movant's "bald assertions,
unsubstantiated conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, or hyper-
bolic rodomontade," and instead stripped the motion to its six core
allegations. 214 The court noted that the motion did not reflect that
the claim would be winnable, holding that as a precondition to relief
under Rule 60(b), the movant must give the trial court reason to be-
lieve that vacating the judgment will "not be an empty exercise." 215
While the union argued that the very filing of a Rule 60(b) (6) claim is
"tantamount to a party's representation that a winnable claim or de-
fense exists," the court disagreed, noting that the union's approach
"smacks of locking the barn door well after the horse has galloped
into the sunset."216 The court held that the claimant need not estab-
lish an ironclad claim or defense that would guarantee success at trial,
but found that the movant must at least establish a potentially merito-
rious claim or defense. 217 The court held that such a showing requires
"more than an unsubstantiated boast," and it dismissed the union's
claim. 218
On the other hand, when litigants do penetrate the trial court
layer of protection in fraud on the court cases, the wasting of judicial
and litigant resources is typically extensive. For instance, in the Penn-
sylvania estate litigation case discussed above, if the trial court or
master had required the objectors to concisely allege specific facts that
could lead to a finding of outcome-determinative fraud, the litigants
and court system might have been spared years of litigation and ex-
211. See Teamsters Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.
1992).
212. Id. at 18.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 20 (citing Boyd v. Bulala, 905 F.2d 764, 769 (4th Cir. 1990)).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 21.
218. Id.
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pense.219 The case demonstrates the need for early and vigilant deci-
sion-making at the trial court level.
C. An Actual Screening System
Many of the federal courts considering Rule 60(b) actions have
adopted the position that claimants must show that they have merito-
rious claims or defenses as a precondition for relief.2 20 "The fre-
quently quoted standard is that the moving party must make
allegations that, if established at trial, would constitute a valid claim or
defense." 221 For example, the First Circuit has clarified that the meri-
torious claim or defense requirement "guards the gateway to Rule
60(b) relief."222
Nevertheless, the cases above demonstrate that gaps in that gate-
way exist and that the legal system may need to institute some sort of
process to ensure that specious claims do not find the holes in the
fence. A screening process or panel could take many forms, but one
possibility would be to model the system on the screening process
adopted by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. 223 Designed to dis-
courage frivolous prisoner lawsuits, this law devised a screening pro-
cess for prisoner claims against the government.22 4 The legislation
requires courts to review any complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or em-
ployee of a governmental entity. 225 After screening the pleading,
before docketing or as soon as practicable after docketing, the court
must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary re-
lief from an immune defendant.226 The legislation currently applies
only in federal actions, but its provisions may be instructive in remedy-
ing problems engendered by an interminable string of lawsuits. 227
A similar system for fraud on the court claims might bolster confi-
dence in the finality of judgments and discourage disappointed liti-
gants from attempting to reopen fairly-won decisions. Litigants
219. See supra notes 2-5, 153-66 and accompanying text.
220. See 12 MooRE, supra note 12, § 60.24.
221. Id.
222. Teamsters Union, Local No. 59, 953 F.2d at 20.
223. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915-1915A (2000).
224. See id. § 1915A.
225. See id. § 1915A(a).
226. See id. § 1915A(b). These provisions have consistently passed constitutional mus-
ter. See, e.g., Singleton v. Smith, 241 F.3d 534, 538-39 (6th Cir. 2001).
227. See Parks v. State, 789 N.E.2d 40, 49-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
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attempting to reopen judgments could be required to file a document
with the rendering court or screening panel describing the exact na-
ture of the fraud alleged, and the court would dismiss the complaint if
it failed to identify facts that could lead to a finding of outcome-deter-
minative fraud.
However, legislators must consider whether creating such a sys-
tem might backfire and actually encourage disgruntled litigants to
take a "second bite at the apple" simply because the procedure has
been narrowly defined. Because these claims are much less numerous
than in the prisoner example, such a drastic and administratively-com-
plicated step may not be necessary. Instead, the goal may be better
achieved through one of the alternatives discussed above.
In addition, some of the same criticisms made to the proposed
changes to Rule 11 could apply to a screening mechanism for fraud
on the court claims. For example, some critics argued that the
amended rule would produce excessive satellite litigation, with liti-
gants testing and applying the rule's new features.228 Nevertheless, just
as Rule 11 struck a reasonable balance between the many competing
interests of litigants seeking sanctions,22 9 drafters could also find a
screening mechanism for fraud on the court claims that achieves the
required balancing of interests.
Conclusion
Finality of judgment matters. Without it, litigants will lose faith
that the legal system can effectively resolve their problems. While
courts must certainly overturn fraudulently procured judgments in
some instances, the cases discussed above demonstrate that litigants in
both the federal and state court systems are misusing the fraud on the
court doctrine. As such, legislators and judges should consider
whether improvements to the rules of procedure, education of trial
court judges, an actual screening system, or a combination of solu-
tions would effectively combat this problem. Whatever the remedy,
something must be done to put an end to the litigation parade.
228. See Developments in the Law-Lauyers' Responsibilities and Lauryers' Responses, 107 HARV.
L. REv. 1547, 1639-40 (1994). These fears appear to have been misguided, as sanctions
litigation appeared to decline after the new rule was implemented. See Laura Duncan, Sanc-
tions Litigation Declining, 81 A.B.A. J. 12, Mar. 1995, at 12.
229. Hirt, supra note 197, at 1051.
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